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This paper studies the business cycle dynamics of the income and wealth 
distributions in the context of the neoclassical growth model where agents are 
heterogeneous in initial wealth and non-acquired skills. Our economy admits a 
representative consumer which enables us to characterize the distributive dynamics by 
aggregate dynamics. We show that inequality in both wealth and income follows a 
counter-cyclical pattern: the former is counter-cyclical because of cyclical fluctuations in 
labor income, while the latter is counter-cyclical due to the wealth-distribution effect. 
We find that the predictions of the model about the income distribution dynamics 
accord well with the U.S. data. 
  
Key words: Neoclassical growth model; heterogeneous agents; aggregation; 
business cycle; income and wealth distributions; inequality 
  
JEL Classification: C68, D31, E32. 
 1 Introduction
This paper examines the business cycle behavior of the income and wealth
distributions in the context of the neoclassical growth model. To this pur-
pose, we extend the benchmark neoclassical setup by Kydland and Prescott
(1982) to include heterogeneous agents, who diﬀer in initial wealth and non-
acquired skills. Under the assumptions of complete markets and identical
homothetic individual preferences, our economy admits a representative con-
sumer in the sense of Gorman (1953), so that the income and wealth distribu-
tions are irrelevant for macroeconomic performance. In contrast, aggregate
ﬂuctuations fully determine the evolution of the income and wealth distri-
butions over the business cycle. We therefore focus on the role of aggregate
ﬂuctuations in distributive dynamics.1
We show that, at any point in time, the income and wealth distributions
in our economy can be represented as a linear combination of the skill dis-
tribution and the initial wealth distribution. During expansions, the weights
of the skill distribution in the income and wealth distributions increase rel-
ative to the corresponding weights of the initial wealth distribution. During
recessions, the reverse situation holds. The empirical evidence indicates that
the skill diﬀerentials across agents are, on average, lower than the wealth dif-
ferentials, which leads us to conclude that inequality in income and wealth
is counter-cyclical. That is, expansions are equalizing, and recessions are
disequalizing.2
In our economy, counter-cyclical behavior of wealth inequality can be un-
derstood by looking at how the wealth of diﬀerent individuals is aﬀected by
the business cycle ﬂuctuations of their labor income. A positive technology
shock raises wages and working hours, thus increasing labor income. For
”rich and low-productive” agents (i.e., those whose wealth share is high in
relation to their skill share), labor income, however, is low in relation to
wealth, so that its increase has little impact on wealth. In contrast, for
”poor and highly-productive” agents, labor income constitutes a large frac-
tion of wealth, so that its increase augments wealth considerably. As a result,
1Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000) also study the implications of a
neoclassical model for income and wealth distributions employing the aggregation theory.
These papers, however, concentrate on deterministic distributive dynamics over the process
of economic development and neglect business cycle ﬂuctuations.
2An extensive review of the literature on inequality can be found in the book edited by
Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000).
3”rich and low-productive” agents decrease their wealth shares, and ”poor and
highly-productive” agents increase their wealth shares, and the inequality in
wealth therefore decreases. With regard to a counter-cyclical behavior of
income inequality, this is due to the wealth-distribution eﬀect: a more equal
distribution of wealth across agents leads to a more equal distribution of
capital gains, thus reducing inequality in income.3
We test the model’s predictions on the business cycle dynamics of the
income distribution with U.S. data. We speciﬁcally study the time-series
properties of the distance between income and skill distributions and between
income and wealth distributions. We obtain that the former distance is
counter-cyclical while the latter is pro-cyclical. We interpret these ﬁndings
as evidence that supports the model’s prediction that, during expansions,
income distribution moves towards skill distribution and, during recessions,
it moves towards wealth distribution. We also evaluate the explanatory power
of the theoretical relation between the coeﬃcient of variation of the income
distribution and the corresponding aggregate variables. We ﬁnd that the
model can explain about 60% of the total variability seen in this coeﬃcient.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 formulates the model and
summarizes the aggregation results. Section 3 studies the model’s distribu-
tional implications. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a heterogeneous agents variant of the standard neoclassical
stochastic growth model by Kydland and Prescott (1982). This variant of
the model was ﬁrst studied in Kydland (1984). Time is discrete and the
horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ T,w h e r eT = {0,1,...}. The economy consists of
a representative production ﬁrm and a set of inﬁnitely-lived agents S.T h e
measure of an agent s in the set S is denoted by ds. The total measure of
agents is one,
 
S ds =1 . There is a complete set of markets, i.e., agents are
permitted to trade state-contingent claims to next-period output.
3A related paper by Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull (1998) studies the busi-
ness cycle dynamics of income distribution in a neoclassical framework with incomplete
markets, restrictions on borrowing and an indivisible labor choice. This paper advocates
the importance of unemployment spells and cyclically-moving factor shares in explaining
the dynamics of income inequality.
4The representative ﬁrm owns the production technology, which is given
by a constant return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function, yt = θtkα
t h
1−α
t ,w h e r e
yt is output; kt and ht are the aggregate inputs of capital and labor, re-
spectively; α ∈ (0,1);a n dθt is an exogenous technology shock. The shock
follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process with a transitional probability given
by Pr{θt+1 = θ
  | θt = θ}θ ,θ∈Θ,w h e r eΘ denotes the set of all the possible
realizations of technology shocks. The proﬁt-maximizing conditions of the
ﬁrm imply that the real return on capital, rt, and the real wage, wt,a r e









The agents are heterogeneous in initial endowment and non-acquired
skills. The skills of agent s reﬂect the number of eﬃciency hours es that
correspond to one physical hour worked by the agent. Note that the individ-
ual skills are assumed to be constant over time and across states of nature.
For the sake of convenience, we normalize the average level of skills to one,  
S esds =1 .
The preferences of an agent s are given by the expected discounted sum
of the period utility functions. The period utility function is deﬁned over
consumption, cs
t, and leisure, ls
t, and is of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) type. The agent is endowed with one unit of time, so that ns
t ≡ 1−ls
t









































where the initial endowment [(1 − d + r0)ks
0 + ms
0 (θ0)] > 0 is given. Here, Et
denotes the conditional expectation; ks






is the portfolio of state-contingent claims; pt (θ) is the price of a claim that
entitles the agent to the payment of one unit of consumption goods in period
t +1if state θ occurs; d ∈ (0,1] is the depreciation rate of capital; δ ∈ (0,1)
is the discount factor; and ﬁnally, µ ∈ (0,1) and η > 0 are the parameters of
the utility function.
We deﬁne an individual’s wealth, Zs
t, as the value of her end-of-period











A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as a sequence of contingency plans





t∈T, for the allocation of the ﬁrm
{kt,h t}t∈T and for the prices {rt,w t,p t (θ)}θ∈Θ,t∈T such that, given the prices,
the sequence of plans for the consumers’ allocation solves each agent’s utility
maximization problem (1), (2); the sequence of plans for the ﬁrm’s allocation


















t+1 (θ)ds =0 ; (4)
and the economy’s resource constraint is satisﬁed:








tds is the aggregate consumption. Moreover, the equilibrium
plans must be such that cs
t ≥ 0, and ns
t ∈ [0,1] for all s, θ, t,a n dwt, rt,
kt ≥ 0 for all θ, t. We assume that equilibrium exists and that it is interior
and unique.
If agents possess identical homothetic preferences and markets are com-
plete, then there exists a representative consumer in the sense of Gorman
(1953). The aggregation theory allows us to characterize the equilibrium in
the heterogeneous agents economy in a simple way.
Proposition 1 For the economy (1) − (5),w eh a v e :















subject to (5); (6)














s∈S is a set of positive numbers with
 
S fsds =1 ; 4
iii).W e a l t ho fa g e n t s ,{Zs
t}
s∈S


















where u1 (cτ,h τ) ≡ c
µ(1−η)−1
τ (1 − hτ)(1−µ)(1−η).
Proof. See Maliar and Maliar (2001), Appendices A and B.
Consequently, to ﬁnd equilibrium in the heterogeneous agents economy
(1) − (5),w es h a l lﬁrst solve for the aggregate quantities from the repre-
sentative consumer model (6) and then restore the individual quantities by
using (7), (8). In the next section, we employ the representation (6)−(8) to
derive some useful analytical results regarding the evolution of the income
and wealth distributions in the model.
3 The model’s distributional implications
Before analyzing the model’s distributional implications, we should highlight
certain aspects of the data. We focus on the empirical facts of the income dis-
tribution dynamics because empirical evidence about the evolution of wealth
distribution is rather scarce. We restrict our attention to distributional regu-
larities observed in the U.S. economy because our subsequent empirical study
is carried out using U.S. data.
Income inequality in the U.S. economy displays both long-run trend and
short-run (business cycle) ﬂuctuations. As regards long-run trend, income
inequality falls during the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e2 0 t hc e n t u r y but increases in 1970’s
and 1980’s (see, e.g., Caselli and Ventura, 2000, Piketty and Saez, 2001).
The business cycle behavior of the U.S. income inequality is documented
by, e.g., Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull (1998). Using the Current
Population Survey data, they calculate the correlations between output and
t h ei n c o m es h a r e so fd i ﬀerent income groups. For the lowest three quintiles,
4The function {fs}
s∈S is related to the welfare weights {λ
s}
s∈S in the associated









7the income shares are pro-cyclical, and the correlation of the income share
with output monotonically decreases from the ﬁrst to the third quintile. For
the forth quintile and for the next 15% of the population, the income shares
are counter-cyclical. Finally, for the top 5% income earners, the income
share is acyclical. Similar regularities about the business cycle dynamics of
the U.S. income quintiles are observed by Dimelis and Livada (1999) from
the U.S. Current Population Report data. The latter paper also reports that
the aggregate inequality measures of the U.S. income distribution such as the
Gini and Theil coeﬃcients are weakly counter-cyclical.5
Our model cannot explain long-run inequality trends observed in the data
(it produces no such trends by construction). However, the model is capable
of generating non-trivial dynamics of the income and wealth distributions
over the business cycle. We therefore focus on the business cycle movements
of these distributions.
We start by analyzing the model’s implications for the wealth distribution



















tds = kt+1 follows from the market clearing condition for
claims in (4).I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h e r ei sas i m p l ef o r m u l at h a tc h a r a c t e r i z e s
the evolution of the wealth distribution in our economy. We speciﬁcally have
the following proposition:





























5See Dimelis and Livada (1999) for a description of business cycle properties of income
inequality indices in the United Kingdom, Italy and Greece.
8Proof. See Appendix A.
According to (10), the wealth distribution in a period t can be represented
as a linear combination of the wealth distribution in any other period v and
the skill distribution. The movements of the variable ξt,v capture the entire
eﬀect of the aggregate dynamics on the wealth distribution.
A straightforward implication of our analysis is that any wealth distri-
bution can be supported in the steady state. Indeed, if the representative
consumer economy (6) starts in the steady state, then we have that ξt,v ≡ 1
for all t, v and, therefore, the initial wealth distribution will be perpetuated,
i.e., zs
t = zs
0 for all t and s. Another case in which the model has trivial
implications with regard to the evolution of the wealth distribution is when
the initial wealth distribution coincides with the skill distribution. In such a
case, the wealth distribution will always be the same, independently of the
movements of the variable ξt,v.
Let us analyze the dynamics of the wealth distribution in a general case.
Fix v =0and denote ξt ≡ ξt,0.C o n d i t i o n(10) implies
corr(z
s
t,y t)=sign | z
s
0 − e
s | corr(ξt,y t), (12)
where sign | x | is the sign of a variable x,a n dcorr(x,y) is the correlation
coeﬃcient between variables x and y.
In our model, the variable ξt moves counter-cyclically. For example, we
have corr(ξt,y t)  − 0.6 under the benchmark parametrization: η =1(i.e.,
the period utility function is logarithmic), α =0 .36, δ =0 .99, d =0 .02, µ =
1/3, θt = θ
ρ
t−1 exp(εt),w h e r eρ =0 .95 and εt ∼ N (0, σ2) with σ =0 .007.
Our ﬁnding that corr(ξt,y t) is negative proved to be robust to modiﬁcations
in the model’s parameters.
The counter-cyclical behavior of the variable ξt can be understood by
looking at the impulse response experiment shown in Figure 1. Here, the
economy, which is initially in the steady state, experiences a positive perma-
nent technology shock in period t. When the utility function is logarithmic,





On impact, both the consumption, ct,a n dt h ec a p i t a l ,kt+1, of the repre-
sentative agent increase. However, given that the agent is risk-averse, the







Figure 1. Impulse response functions under the benchmark parameterization.
a




































aParameter values: η =1, µ =1/3, α =0.36, δ =0.99, d=0.02, ρ =0.95, σ =0.007. relative rise in consumption is lower than the increase in capital, so that ξt
goes down.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ev a r i a b l eξt moves counter-cyclically implies that in our
model, the agent’s s wealth share, zs
t, increases (decreases) during expansions,
if her initial wealth endowment is lower than her skills, zs
0 <e s (higher than
her skills, zs
0 >e s). Unfortunately, we cannot test this prediction of the
model because, as we have said, there is no suﬃcient empirical evidence on
the dynamics of the wealth distribution over the business cycle.
We now focus on the dynamics of income distribution. We deﬁne the
individual’s income, Y s
t , as the sum of the returns on her asset portfolio and











It follows from deﬁnition (14) that the individual income depends on the
composition of the agent’s asset portfolio, i.e., on how much capital and how
many units of claims of each type θ ∈ Θ were purchased by the agent in the
previous period. Note that in our economy the equilibrium composition of
individual asset portfolio is not uniquely determined.6 As a result, there is
indeterminacy in the individual income.
This indeterminacy is due to the assumption of complete markets. In our
economy, the agents are not concerned about how much income they receive
in each period, but rather about how much income they receive over their
life-time. Consequently, the agents are indiﬀerent between any sequences of
asset portfolios as long as they lead to the same expected life-time payoﬀ.T o
overcome the problem of indeterminacy, we need to impose some additional
restrictions on the composition of the agents’ portfolios. The restriction
we use is that the state contingent claims are not traded so that only the
capital stock is in operation. Since holding the portfolio, which is composed
of the capital stock only, is optimal, such a restriction is consistent with our
deﬁnition of equilibrium.
Let ys









Concerning the income distribution, we get the following result.
6The reason for the indeterminacy is that there are more assets traded in the equilibrium
(Θ types of claims and the capital stock) than the economy’s states (Θ). As a consequence,
one of the assets will be always a linear combination of the others.





v +( 1− ϑt,v)e
s, (16)
where ϑt,v is deﬁned by
ϑt,v ≡ αξt−1,v +









Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, similar to wealth distribution, the income distribution in our econ-
omy is given by a linear combination of the wealth distribution in some
period v and the skill distribution. Again, only one aggregate variable, ϑt,v,
is needed to fully characterize the evolution of the income distribution.
Let us ﬁx v =0and denote ϑt ≡ ϑt,v.C o n d i t i o n(16) yields the formula
for the income distribution dynamics, which parallels the one previously ob-
tained for the wealth distribution dynamics,
corr(y
s
t,y t)=sign | z
s
0 − e
s | corr(ϑt,y t). (18)
We ﬁnd, by simulation, that the variable ϑt moves counter-cyclically. How-
ever, corr(ϑt,y t) is weaker than corr(ξt,y t). For example, under our bench-
mark parameterization, we have corr(ϑt,y t)  − 0.2,a n ds i m i l a rv a l u e so f
this statistic are obtained in a wide range of the model’s parameters.
The determinants of the correlation corr(ϑt,y t) can be seen from the
impulse response experiment in Figure 1. In response to the shock, the
aggregate labor input, ht, increases, which pushes ϑt up. The variable ξt
however goes down, and its reduction is subsequently transmitted to ϑt+1.
Starting from period t +1 ,t h ee ﬀect associated with ξt drives ϑt+1 down.
Given that corr(ϑt,y t) is, overall, negative, we conclude that the agent’s s
income share, ys
t, is pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) when zs
0 <e s (zs
0 >e s).
A counter-cyclical behavior of ξt and ϑt implies that wealth and income
inequality in our economy is counter-cyclical. Indeed, the weights of the
initial wealth distribution, given by ξt and ϑt in (10) and (16), respectively,
decrease during expansions and increase during recessions. The opposite
is true for the weights of the skill distribution, (1 − ξt) and (1 − ϑt).T h e
(initial) wealth distribution in the data, however, is more unequal than the
12skill distribution.7 As a result, expansions (recessions) have an equalizing
(disequalizing) eﬀect on the income and wealth distributions.
As far as the dynamics of the income distribution are concerned, the
steady state value of ϑt is around 0.3, which implies that, near the steady
state, ϑt lies in the interval [0,1]. We can therefore state that, during ex-
pansions, income distribution moves towards skill distribution, {es}
s∈S,w h i l e
during recessions, it does toward the initial wealth distribution, {zs
0}
s∈S.T h i s
statement does not apply, however, to the wealth distribution, because the
variable ξt does not, in general, belong to the interval [0,1]:i ti se q u a lt o1
in period t =0 , and it is typically smaller (larger) than 1 when the economy
expands (contracts).
We shall now analyze the mechanism behind the counter-cyclical behavior
of inequality in the model. Formulas (10) and (16) are not suitable for this
purpose because they characterize the evolution of the income and wealth
distributions in terms of aggregate dynamics, and do not reveal what is hap-
pening at the individual level. We therefore focus on the decisions of hetero-



































1+( ht − µ)φt
 
, (20)
where φt ≡ wt
(1−d+rt)kt(1−µ).E q u a t i o n(19) follows by the linear homogeneity
of the Cobb-Douglas production function; equation (20) is obtained by using
budget constraint (2) and the intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition relating
consumption and working hours (see formula (29) in Appendix A).
As seen from (19) and (20), the business cycle behavior of ys
t and zs
t
is determined by the responsiveness to shocks of ns




t relative to ht, respectively. The following proposition characterizes the
individual labor choices by comparing them with the corresponding decisions
of the representative consumer.
7For example, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) report that in the 1992 Survey of Con-
sumption Financing data set, the wealth shares of the bottom 40% and the top 1% of
the population are 2.2% and 28.2%, respectively, while the corresponding earnings (skill)
shares are 10.3% and 14.1%, respectively.
13Proposition 4 For an agent with zs


















Proof. See Appendix A.
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state in period t−1 and that
it experiences a positive technology shock in period t. All agents increase
their working hours. However, in accordance with (21), agents whose skills
are high relative to wealth, zs
t−1 >e s, increase their working hours more
than do agents whose skills are low relative to wealth, zs
t−1 <e s. It follows
from (19) that the income shares of agents with zs
t−1 >e s  
zs
t−1 <e s 
go
up (down) which corresponds to the shift of the income distribution {ys
t}
s∈S




 s∈S. As a result, in period t,i n c o m e
inequality rises. (In our impulse response experiment, this eﬀect is captured
by an increase in ϑt immediately after the shock).
Wealth inequality, however, falls in period t.C o n d i t i o n(20) implies that
the change in the agent’s s wealth share is determined by how much she













t − µ) − (ht − µ)
 




t−1 <e s 
. Thus, an increase in investment (income) relative to wealth is
lower for agents with zs
t−1 >e s than for those with zs
t−1 <e s (even though
t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ef o rt h e i ri n c o m el e v e l s ) .T h ei n t u i t i o nb e h i n dt h i sr e s u l t
is as follows: ”Rich and low-productive” agents cannot signiﬁcantly increase
their wealth by working more hours, because labor income represents only a
small fraction of their wealth. On the contrary, ”poor and highly-productive”
agents can achieve a substantial percentage increase in their wealth by work-
ing just a few more hours.
The t- p e r i o dw e a l t hd i s t r i b u t i o na ﬀects the t+1-period income distribu-
tion because wealth accumulated in t determines capital income in t +1 .I t
follows from (19) t h a tt h ei n c o m es h a r e so fa g e n t sw i t hzs
t−1 >e s  
zs
t−1 <e s 





moves in the direction of the skill distribution {es}
s∈S. The result is that
income inequality begins to fall. (In our impulse response experiment, this
14eﬀect corresponds to a decrease in ϑt from period t+1 onwards). The counter-
cyclical movement of income inequality in our model is therefore due to the
wealth-distribution eﬀect.
The model’s prediction that income inequality is counter-cyclical agrees
with the previously discussed ﬁndings of Dimelis and Livada (1999), that
the Gini and Theil coeﬃcients of the U.S. income distribution are weakly
counter-cyclical. The empirical evidence documented by Castañeda et al.
(1998), indicates, however, that expansions have an ambiguous eﬀect on in-
come inequality. Speciﬁcally, inequality between the bottom and middle
deciles goes down, while inequality between the middle and top deciles goes
up. If the top-income group is excluded from the sample, the behavior of
income inequality would be counter-cyclical, as predicted by our model.8
The empirical regularities discussed provide indirect evidence in support
of relation (16) which, according to our model, describes the evolution of
income distribution over the business cycle. In the following section, we per-
form a direct test of this relation based upon micro-data on the contributions
to income inequality of wage income versus wealth income.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we conduct an empirical test of the model. We ﬁrst study
whether the data support our hypothesis that income distribution moves
between skill and wealth distributions over the business cycle. We then derive
and estimate the equation that describes the behavior of the coeﬃcient of
variation of income distribution in the model. For our empirical study, we
use data on the U.S. economy. The household data is taken from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The aggregate time-series come from
the data base of the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of
Commerce. The sample period is 1967-1991. The further description of the
data is provided in Appendix B.
4.1 Distance between the distributions
According to our model, income distribution moves towards skill distribu-
tion during expansions, and towards the initial wealth distribution during
8The top-income group consists of executives who get high bonuses during expansions.
Our model is obviously too simple to account for such evidence.
15recessions. To examine whether this implication agrees with the data, we
study the business cycle behavior of the distances between income and skill
distributions and between income and wealth distributions.
As a measure of the distance between two functions G1 : U ⊆ R → R
and G2 : U ⊆ R → R, we use the Kolmogorov distance (see, e.g., Shorack
and Wellner, 1986, Section 2.1)
D(G1,G 2) ≡ sup
u∈U
|G1 (u) − G2 (u)|. (23)
To characterize the empirical distributions of income, wealth and skills,
w eu s et w oa l t e r n a t i v er e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,t h eL o r e n zc u r v ea n dt h ec u m u l a t i v e
distribution function. Let {xs}
s∈S be a discrete and ﬁnite set. The Lorenz




s=1 xs,w h e r e
 
x(s) s∈S is the ascending sequence composed of
the elements of {xs}
s∈S. The Lorenz curve in other points of the interval [0,1]
is obtained by linear interpolation. The cumulative distribution function
F{xs} : R →[0,1] is deﬁned by F{xs}(u) ≡ 1
S
 S
s=1 I(xs ≤ u),w h e r eI(A)
is the indicator function, which is equal to 1,i fe v e n tA occurs, and to 0,
otherwise.
We interpret an agent in the model as a household in the data. Thus, the
agent’s income and wealth are those of the household. The agent’s skills are
proxied by the wage of the household’s head.
The data on wealth are available from the PSID for the years 1984 and
1989. We report only the results for the distances between income distribu-
tion and the 1989 wealth distribution, {zs
1989}
s∈S. The results obtained with
the 1984 wealth distribution are similar.
The skill distribution is assumed to be time-invariant in the model. How-
ever, it changes in the data over time. To compute the distance between the
income and skill distributions, we therefore explore two alternatives: one,
when the skill distribution changes over time (in each period t,i ti sp r o x i e d
by t-period wage distribution), and another, when the skill distribution is the
same for all periods (it is represented by the distribution composed of the
data on wages over the entire sample period). We ﬁnd that, in both cases,
the distance between income and skill distributions displays similar business




We also investigate whether the model’s distributional implications hold
for diﬀerent income groups. Speciﬁcally, in each period t,w es p l i tt h es a m -
16ple into ﬁve equal-sized income groups, i.e., the poorest 20%,t h en e x t20%,
etc. We denote these groups by [0,0.2], [0.2,0.4], [0.4,0.6], [0.6,0.8], [0.8,1.0]
and refer to them as quintiles. Furthermore, to examine the evolution of
the income shares of the top-income earners, we consider, separately, three
upper-income groups, i.e., [0.9,0.95], [0.95,0.99], [0.99,1.0]. For each income
group [b1,b 2], we construct the Lorenz curves of the income and skill distribu-

















.9 The results obtained with the cumu-
lative distribution functions are similar to those obtained with the Lorenz
curves and are therefore not reported.
To study the behavior of the distances over the business cycle, we ﬁrst
log and then detrend the time-series for distances and output, by using the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 100. This value of the
smoothing parameter is chosen following Castañeda et al. (1998).
Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the computed time-series for the distances be-
tween the income and wealth distributions and between the income and skill
distributions, respectively. In the left- and right-hand columns, we provide
the undetrended series and the corresponding cyclical components, respec-
tively. To appreciate the business cycle behavior of the distance series, in
the right-hand columns we also provide the detrended output series. Firstly,
we notice that the distances computed with the Lorenz curves and those
computed with the cumulative distribution functions follow similar patterns,
both in the long run and over the business cycle.
Regarding the long-run behavior, we observe that income distribution
moves from a relatively equal skill distribution to a relatively unequal wealth
distribution, which implies that income inequality rises over the sample pe-
riod. As pointed-out before, long-run tendencies like this cannot be explained
in the context of our stationary model.
As far as the business cycle dynamics are concerned, we detect a pro-
nounced counter-cyclical pattern of the distance between income and skill
distributions. In the case of the distance between income and wealth distri-
butions, the evidence is not so strong, although a certain pro-cyclical pattern
c a nb ep e r c e i v e d .T om a k eab e t t e rj u d g e m e n t ,w ec o m p u t et h es a m p l ec o r -
9We cannot proceed by computing the time series for distances between the income
and wealth distributions of diﬀerent income groups the same way. Given that our income
groups are composed of distinct households in diﬀerent periods, we can only compute such
distances for the years 1984 and 1989, for which data on wealth are available.


















Figure 2. The distance between the income and skill distributions in the U.S economy.


















































































Figure 3. The distance between the income and wealth distributions in the U.S economy.
































































Output  relations between the detrended distance and output series. The results are
reported in Table 1. As can be seen, the correlation of output with the dis-
tance between the income and skill distributions is about −0.6, while the
correlation of output with the distance between the income and wealth dis-
tributions is about 0.2. Taken as a whole, these ﬁndings are favorable to our
theoretical model.
In Figure 4 and Figure 5, we plot the distance series corresponding to the
income quintiles and the three upper-income groups, respectively. In Table
1, we report the correlations of the distances with output. In general, the
results for the income groups are similar to those for the entire sample: the
distances show an upward long-run trend and move counter-cyclically. The
only exception is the [0.9,0.95] income group for which the distance between
the income and skill distributions is weakly pro-cyclical.10
Finally, we verify the robustness of our ﬁndings with respect to the con-
cept of the distance used. We speciﬁcally repeat all the previous compu-
tations, using an alternative measure of the distance, which is the Wasser-
stein distance, deﬁned as
  




and Wellner, 1986, Section 2.6). The results we obtain with the Wasserstein
distance prove to be very close to those we got with the Kolmogorov distance.
4.2 Coeﬃcient of variation of the income distribution
Our analysis implies that the evolution of an aggregate measure of income in-
equality, such as the Coeﬃcient of Variation (CV) o ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,
can be fully characterized by the dynamics of the representative consumer
economy (6). Indeed, substituting (16) in the deﬁnition of the CV of the









2 ds = a1 + a2ϑt + a3ϑ
2
t, (24)

























10The pro-cyclical behavior of the distance here is presumably related to the previously
mentioned fact that executives get high bonuses during expansions.
20Table 1. Selected second moment properties of the distances between the income and skill
distributions and between the income and wealth distributions in the U.S. economy.
























































































































Note: σx is the standard deviation of a variable xt; corr(xt,y t) is the correlation coeﬃcient
between variables xt and yt. All the statistics reported are computed after the logging
and detrending the corresponding variables by using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a










Figure 4. The distance between the Lorenz curves of the income and skill distributions
 in the U.S economy: income quintiles.






















































































































Figure 5. The distance between the Lorenz curves of the income and skill distributions 
in the U.S economy: top income groups.

































































dHere, for a clearer exposition, we ﬁx v =0 .F o r m u l a (24) provides a basis
for econometric estimation. We focus on the case of the logarithmic utility
function. Substituting (13), (17) into (24) yields
CV
2































where εt is an error term, and the coeﬃcients β1,...,β6 are deﬁned by
β1 = a1, β2 =
a2αk1
c0




















According to (25),t h ec o e ﬃcients a1 and a3 are always positive, and the sign
of the coeﬃcient a2 is determined by speciﬁc wealth and skill distributions.
On the basis of (27), (28), we would therefore expect the coeﬃcients β1, β3,
β5, β6 to be positive and the sign of the coeﬃcients β2, β4 to coincide with
that of a2.
We estimate the regression equation (26) subject to the restrictions in
(28). The estimation is carried out by constrained maximum likelihood un-
der the assumption of normal errors. The results of the estimation are pre-
sented in the ﬁrst panel of Table 2, with two diﬀerent types of t-statistics, the
Hessian-based and quasi-maximum-likelihood, which are robust to misspec-
iﬁcation (see, e.g., White, 1982). The adjusted coeﬃcient of determination
shows that our model can explain about 60% of the total variation in the
squared coeﬃcient of variation of income distribution. Furthermore, as pre-
dicted by the model, β1 and β3 have a positive sign, and β2 and β4 have an
identical (negative) sign.
To examine the validity of the restrictions in (28), we estimate the unre-
stricted version of equation (26). This estimation is performed by Ordinary
Least-Squares (OLS), which is equivalent to maximum likelihood with nor-
mal errors. The results are presented in the second panel of Table 2, as well
as two types of t-statistics, OLS and heteroskedasticity-consistent (see, e.g.,
White, 1980). As can been seen, the estimated beta coeﬃcients in the unre-
stricted and restricted regressions diﬀer substantially, which is probably due
24Table 2. The CV of the income distribution regressions: estimates for the U.S. economy.








Coefficient 8.040 -38.17 48.52 -0.975 - - 0.6011 0.5961 1.9417
t1 1.055 -0.558 0.364 -0.188
t2 0.869 -0.372 0.232 -0.113
Unrestricted
Coefficient 11.506 52.658 13.685 16.810 6.337 31.560 0.5600 0.6237 2.0435
t1 1.087 0.570 0.157 1.033 1.154 1.058





t is the squared sum of residuals; R
2
is the adjusted coeﬃcient of determination;
D.-W.is the Durbin-Watson statistics; in the restricted regression, t1 and t2 are, respec-
tively, the Hession-based and quasi-maximum-likelihood t-statistics; in the unrestricted
regression, t1 and t2 are, respectively, the OLS and heterogeneity-consistent t-statistics.to a problem of multi-collinearity. The global ﬁt of the unrestricted regres-
sion, however, is close to that of the restricted one (the adjusted coeﬃcient
of determination in the former case is only 2.8% higher than in the latter
one). We perform the formal test of the validity of the restrictions in (28) by
computing the likelihood-ratio statistic. This statistic proved to be very low
(p − value =0 .5167), which means that the null hypothesis that the restric-
tions in (28) hold is accepted for any reasonable signiﬁcance level. We arrive
at the same conclusion when we use Wald and Lagrange-multiplier tests.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the business cycle behavior of income and wealth dis-
tributions in a heterogeneous agents version of the standard neoclassical
growth model. Heterogeneity is in two dimensions, initial endowment and
non-acquired skills. We show that if markets are complete and agents have
identical preferences of the CRRA type, the evolution of the income and
wealth distributions in the model is fully characterized by the dynamics of
the associated representative consumer setup. Two implications of this result
for the income distribution dynamics are as follows: First, the income dis-
tribution approaches the skill distribution and the initial wealth distribution
during expansions and recessions, respectively, which suggests that income
inequality follows a counter-cyclical pattern. Second, the evolution of the co-
eﬃcient of variation of the income distribution is completely determined by
the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables. We ﬁnd that these predictions
of the model agree well with the U.S. data.
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276 Appendices
I nA p p e n d i xA ,w ep r o v i d et h ep r o o f st oP r o p o s i t i o n s2 ,3 ,4i nt h em a i n
text. In Appendix B, we describe the data used for empirical study.
6.1 Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2The ﬁrst-order condition of the individual problem



























By using the formula for cs

























































As condition (33) is to be satisﬁed for all t, we can write the same condition
for some period v  = t. By combining (33) written for t and v,w ec a n
eliminate the term (fs − es). T h i sg i v e su se q u a t i o n s(10) and (11) in the
main text.
28Proof of Proposition 3 Under the Cobb-Douglas production function,
the individual income share, ys
t, is described by equation (19).A c c o r d i n gt o











Expressing fs from the recursive constraint (33), written for t = v,a n d
substituting it into the formula for ns
t in (7) yields
n
s











By substituting (34) and (35) into (19), we obtain equations (16) and (17).
Proof of Proposition 4 Diﬀerentiating the formula for ns
t in (7) with









According to (33), fs lies between agent’s skill share, es,a n dh e rw e a l t h
share, zs
t−1, i.e., es ( fs ( zs
t−1 when es ( zs
t−1. This fact together with
formula (36) implies results (21) and (22).
6.2 Appendix B
The variables we take from the PSID are as follows: the yearly household
money income, Y s
t ; the yearly working hours of the head, Ns
t ;t h ea v e r a g e
hourly wage of the head, Ws














where St denotes the number of observations in the PSID cross-section in year
t. Given that the average share of time spent working in the U.S. is estimated
to be 0.31 (see Juster and Staﬀord, 1991), we deﬁne ht by normalizing the
mean of the time-series for Ht correspondingly, i.e., ht ≡ 0.31Ht  1991
t=1967 Ht.
We construct the series for output, consumption and investment by using
the data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce (available from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank
29of Saint-Louis). Output, yt,i sd e ﬁn e da sr e a lG N P .C o n s u m p t i o n ,ct,i n -
cludes real personal expenditure on non-durables and services. Investment,
it, is real personal consumption of durables and real ﬁxed private investment.
We convert the series for output, consumption and investment in per-capita
terms.
We compute the series for the capital stock to match the data on in-




t jointly with the capital accumulation equation,
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it. (37)
The estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood assuming a Gaussian
AR(1) process for log(θt).
30